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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the extent of default among beneficiaries of government sponsored loan scheme. The loan 
performance indices estimated reveal that over 75% of the loans disbursed by AKSALB in the period under review 
were still held by 59 percent of the loan beneficiaries. This situation is an indication of high level of loan defaulting 
among the benefiting farmers. Certain personal and facility factors are estimated to determine the probability of 
default among the beneficiaries. Notably among these include sex, household size, farm size, loan from other sources, 
primary occupation of the beneficiary, time lapse between loan application and disbursement, total farm expenditure 
and duration of the granted loans. With such high level of default, the Board outreach and sustainability capacity is 
questionable thus putting a caveat on the relevance of the Board as agricultural micro financing institution.
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INTRODUCTION
Provision of viable credit delivery system has been a 
cardinal mission of government in developing economies. 
Often these governments practiced the policy of providing 
subsidized credits to resource-poor farmers through 
the formal financial intermediaries with the view to 
insulating them from the usurious tendencies of informal 
credit sources [26]. In Nigeria, governments at the three 
tiers of governance have involved directly or indirectly 
in small to large-scale financial assistance to farmers 
as a major policy strategy for increased agricultural 
productivity [25]; [13]; [2] and [4]. The practice of micro 
credit scheme is celebrated in many government circles 
as poverty reduction-focused programme. This informed 
the multiplicity of different financing programmes 
aimed toward resource poor farming households by 
different governments. The nature of these schemes tend 
to be all embracing in the context that lending bodies, 
which in most cases are government agencies, place 
little or no restriction on the potential beneficiaries. In 
essence, conditions for granting these micro credits to the 
beneficiaries are less restrictive [3].
The Nigerian Local Development Board (NLDB) was 
the first statutory body charged with the responsibility of 
providing agricultural credit in 1946 and by 1955, Regional 
Finance Corporations (RFC) took over the responsibility. 
However, a major reform occurred when the federal 
government instituted erstwhile Nigerian Agricultural 
and Cooperative Bank (NACB) and Agricultural Credit 
Guaranteed Scheme (ACGS). At the States levels, State 
Credit Corporations, Units of the States’ Ministries of 
Agriculture, Cooperative organizations and the World 
Bank assisted Agricultural Development Programmes 
(ADP) have been involved in extending formal credits 
to agriculture.
The issue of accessibility and sustainability of these 
credits by government intermediation have been greatly 
debated and criticized. Lack of enforcement of loan 
contracts [11], low and poor recovery performance 
[18], and government imprudent interference [8] are 
some of the factors alleged for the poor performance 
of these government directed credit schemes. To large 
extent, provision of these ‘soft’ credits to the intended 
beneficiaries is fraught with difficulties. Notably among 
these difficulties is the problem of delinquency among 
the beneficiaries, which is a common feature of the public 
credit schemes in most developing countries (Osuntogun, 
[17] and  Akinwumi, [2].
Strategic defaulting of loan is quite widespread among 
the opportunistic farmers who consider government 
sponsored loans more as gift than as debt that have to 
be paid back [19]. Specifically, Jackelen and Rhyne, [12] 
noted that default rates are generally higher among those 
who borrow from government sponsored sources than 
those who borrow from moneylenders and other informal 
lenders. Besides, high covariate risk of agricultural 
production [6] and the low level of commercialization 
in farming business add to the propensity of defaulting 
among the beneficiaries of these credit sources. On 
the part of the lending institutions, they often lack 
detailed local knowledge about the beneficiaries’ 
creditworthiness. These institutions also face problems 
in screening beneficiaries before lending and monitoring 
use of loans and ensuring repayment [19]; [10] and [1]. 
Generally, repayment rates have remained quite low 
and poor. As such, these government sponsored credit 
provision schemes are more or less avenues of welfare or 
patronage, rather than sustainable commercial schemes.
The high rate of default nevertheless reduces the loanable 
funds available and requires substantial amount of 
administrative cost and time to recover the loans. Thus, 
potential beneficiaries seldom benefit from reliable and 
preferential access to future loan funds. As noted in 
the separate works of Eaton et al [9] and Bell [5] the 
prevalence of strategic defaulting can be optimal for the 
lender to ration credit, and the maximum credit offered 
decrease with the interest rate. It therefore follows that 
demand for these productive credits is still higher than 
the supply due to the problem of high defaulting rate. 
Consequently, this creates high moral hazard problems 
and mistrust, which deter financial needs of farmers. 
This issue of delinquency among other issues therefore 
makes the policy of providing these cheap credits by 
government not to achieve its desired result [20]. This 
study therefore attempts to evaluate the loan default rate 
among beneficiaries of a State government sponsored 
loan scheme, Akwa Ibom State Agricultural Loan 
Board (AKSALB), the level of loan performance of the 
Board and the factors affecting loan default among the 
beneficiaries with a view to suggesting remedial actions.
Akwa Ibom State Agricultural Loan Board (AKSALB) 
was set up in 1988, as empowered by Edict No. 6 of the 
State. But the Board actually started granting loans to 
farmers in 1990. Its loan portfolio covers short-, medium- 
and long-term loans to mainly farmers and agro-allied 
operators. The organization and operation of the Board 
is through two separate committees- one at the State 
level, Special Project Unit (SPU) and the other at the 
local government level, Local Loan Committee (LLC). 
Though the SPU is the executive body, the process of 
loan granting begins at the LLC, where application 
forms are obtained. The LLC, which is available at every 
local government area in the State, is directly involved 
in screening, monitoring and enforcement activities. It 
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is actually the LLC that recommends or otherwise the 
suitability of prospective beneficiaries to the SPU for or 
against granting of such loans. The disbursement of the 
loan fund in cheque starts immediately the Board, SPU 
approves it and the loan is guaranteed by a third party 
(usually a civil servant), which is the only collateral 
required by the intended beneficiary to present. In every 
year, over 70 percent of the loans approved are disbursed 
as short term facilities so as to ensure rapid circulating of 
the limited fund to interested farmers.
Theoretical and Statistical Issues
Lending institutions, either public or private, consider 
certain characteristics of potential borrowers before 
loan/credit of any kind is granted. These, according to 
Poulton et al, [19] include economic characteristics 
(their capacity to make good use of additional capital, 
so as to generate funds for repayment of the loan in the 
time specified) and their personal characteristics (their 
likely reliability in repaying the loan, given the means to 
do so). Evaluation of the vectors of these factors forms 
the framework of decision by lending body to grant 
loan to intending beneficiaries on the expectation of 
full recovering. As such, the finite number of potential 
borrowers seeking credit from a lending body has different 
probabilities of either repaying or defaulting irrespective 
of the credit contract, which specify the condition of 
lending. Strategic defaulting is associated with personal 
characteristics of the borrowers whereby there is a willful 
decision by the borrower to default- moral hazard, even 
when the benefiting business has yielded enough revenue 
to effect repayment. According to papers such as [9], 
[[5] and [7] prevalence of strategic defaulting noted in 
developing economies is a condition for credit rationing 
by uninformed lender. Business failure, as characterized 
agricultural operations, increases the risk of portfolio 
default. Therefore, the probability of portfolio loan 
default is high in event of poor price and crop yield and 
failure.  
Lender extends productive credit to his client under the 
condition of imperfection. That is, he cannot say with 
certainty that the borrower will repay under the agreed 
contract terms. Hence, repayment of loan by borrower is 
a probability decision: full repayment, partial repayment 
and no repayment when due. The probability of full 
repayment is formally presented as;
PrF (Li) = E [Li + θt ]      (1),
where Li represents the amount of loan collected at 
specified interest rate, i, θt  is the amount of interest the 
Figure 1: Map of Nigeria showing the study area, Akwa Ibom State
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borrower pay to the lender for using the credit within 
the specified time period t.  Equation (1) shows that an 
equilibrium state of financial contract between lender and 
borrower is attained when probability of default is zero. 
In the cases of partial and no repayment, the equilibrium 
is distorted and the probability of default is presented as;
PrD(Li) = E[ Li + θt] – ηrt     (2)
Where ηrt  = composite default effect of partial (p) and 
no (n) repayment at a specific time period. Thus r = p 
+ n.  The incorporation of ηrt in equation (2) is meant 
to show the crowding-out effect of failure of borrower 
to meet contractual arrangement, which is considered 
as an exogenous cost to the lender. The magnitude of 
ηrt indicates the intensity of borrower’s deviation from 
the financial contract and it approaches 1 when the 
borrower has not made any repayment, i.e. ηrt→1 for no 
repayment. 
Taking ηrt as an event that can occur when loan is granted 
to a borrower, then it is right to say that ηrt will happen, 
say e to 1 odd. This means it is possible that ηrt will 
occur e times as likely that ηrt will not occur. Statistically 
therefore, e to f odds will be taken to mean the same thing 
as e/f to 1, i.e., the ratio between the two numbers is the 
only quantity of importance when stating odd f. Now if 
it is e times as likely that ηrt will occur as that ηrt will not 
occur, then the probability that ηrt occurs must be e/(e + 
1), since we have
P(ηrt) = e P(ήrt)    (3)
and
P(ηrt) + P(ήrt) = 1     (4)
In general, the statement that the odds are e to f in favor 
of an event ηrt occurring
is equivalent to the statement that
Table 1: Description of Explanatory Variable in the Model 
Explanatory
Variables 
Description of the Variable 
AGE Age of beneficiaries in years 
SEX Sex of beneficiaries (male=1 and female=0 
HHS Numbers of people living in the beneficiaries  
FAS Farm size of the beneficiaries cultivated with the loan collected 
EDU Number of years of education of beneficiaries 
LOS Loan from other sources (dummy, 1=yes and o, otherwise 
VIS Visit by loan supervisor (dummy; 1= yes and o, otherwise 
POC Primary occupation of the beneficiaries (farming=1 and 0 otherwise 
TIL Time lapse between loan application and disbursement 
TFE Total farm expenditure in naira 
DUL Duration of loan to the beneficiaries  
Table 2: Loan Statistics of AKSALB (1990-2003) 
Description Uyo Zone Eket Zone Ikot Ekpene Zone 
No. of loan application 665 830 740 
No. of beneficiaries 431  509 454 
Amount granted as loan N5,617,000.00 N 7,336,000.00 N 5,842,000.00 
No. of  beneficiaries 
who repaid fully 
202 192 187 
Amount fully repaid N 1,451,457.94 N 1,309,642.86 N 986,589.63 
No. of beneficiaries who 
repaid partially 
140 155 165 
Amount partially repaid N 2,327,658.56 N 2,824,714.00 N 3,078,397.57 
No. of beneficiaries who 
made no repaid 
89 162 102 
Amount not repaid N 1,837,883.50 N 3,201,643.14 N 1,777,012.80 
Note: $1.00 is equivalent to about  N150.00 as at 2004. 
Source: Akwa Ibom State Agricultural Loans Board (AKSALB), 2003. 
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       (5)
 =
If we let P (ηrt) = p, then the equation (5) can easily be 
solved for e/f in terms of
p; we obtain,




The study was carried out in Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria. 
It is one of the 36 States in the Nigeria and it is a major 
crude oil producing State in the Niger Delta region. The 
State falls within the humid tropics with two distinctive 
seasons- dry and rainy season. Mean daily maximum 
temperature are regular about 260 – 330 C and the relative 
humidity is between 50 to 60% during the dry season and 
between 60 and 90% in the rainy season. The favorable 
climate encourages extensive agricultural production. 
With a population of about 3.9 million people, over 
70% are involved in agriculture for both subsistence and 
income generation. 
DATA COLLECTION AND SAMPLING 
PROCEDURE
Empirical data used in this study include both primary 
data and secondary data. Secondary data were collected 
from the office of AKSALB. The primary data were 
collected with the aid of structured questionnaire, which 
were administered to selected 
beneficiaries of the loans. Multistage sampling method 
was employed in selecting the beneficiaries. The first 
stage involved purposive selection of the three zones of 
the Board operation. This is to ensure that all the operative 
base of the Board is covered. The second stage involved 
random selection of three local government areas from 
each of the three zones. The last stage involved random 
selection of 10 beneficiaries from each of the nine LGAs, 
thirty from each zones, from the list of beneficiaries made 
available by the Board. 
DATA ANALYSIS
Loan Performance Measures
This involved evaluation of two indices. These include 
loan repayment index and borrower repayment rate.
Loan Repayment Index
This is evaluated as follows:
LRI = [BVRf/VB + w2 (BVRp/VB)]*100 (7)
Where LRI is loan repayment index, which shows the 
level of repayment made by a beneficiaries; w2 = NRCp/
TNLOp; BVRf = value of loan collected by those who made 
full repayment; VB = total value of loans outstanding in 
a particular period; BVRp = value of loans collected by 
those who made partial repayment; NRCp = number of 
borrowers who made partial repayment; TNLOp = total 
number of borrowers who have outstanding loan to 
repay.
 Loan default index is thus measure as follows:
LDI = 100 – LRI    (8)
Borrower Repayment Rate
This is given as:
BRR = [BNFf/NB + w1(BNRp/NB)]*100 (9)
Where BRR is the borrowers’ repayment rate, which is 
defined as the rate at which the borrowers repay or fulfill 
their loan obligation; w1 = VRCp/TVLOp; BNFf = number 
of borrowers who made full repayment; NB = total 
numbers of beneficiaries in a particular period; BNRp 
= numbers of borrowers who made partial repayment; 
VRCp = value of repayment collected from those who 
made partial repayment; TVLOp = total value of loans 
outstanding for those who made partial repayment.
Borrowers’ default index is then measures as follows: 
BDR = 100 – BRR   (10)
Where BDR is borrowers’ default ratio.
Loan Default Determinants
Conceptually, the inability of borrower to meet contractual 
arrangement as agreed when due amounts to defaulting. 
But there are degrees and intensities of defaulting. This 
therefore suggests that Tobit estimation should be used 
[22]. We chose the Tobit model by assuming that the 
concentration of the dependent variable cluster toward the 
left limit (i.e. zero) and because it does not only explain 
the value of dependent or the probability of defaulting or 
not defaulting, but also the magnitude of the defaulting. 
We develop the loan default model following [14] and 
[15] specifications:
Let IA = intensity of loan default, IA* = the solution 
to utility maximization problem of intensity of loan 
default subject to a set of constraints per beneficiary and 
conditional on being above a certain limit, IA0, situation 
of full repayment. Therefore:
IA = IA* if IA* > IA0
     = 0     if IA* ≤ I A0   (11)
Equation (11) represents a censored distribution of 
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intensity of defaulting since the value of IA for full 
repayment of loan equals zero. Following Tobin [22] and 
Nkonya et al [15], the expected intensity of loan default 
E (IA) is given as:
E(IA) = XβF(z) + σf(z)   (12)
Where X is a vector of explanatory variables, F (z) is 
the cumulative normal distribution of z, f(z) is the value 
of the derivative of the normal curve at a given point, 
z is the Z-score for the area under normal curve, β is a 
vector of Tobit maximum likelihood estimates, and σ is 
the standard error of the error term.
The marginal effect of each explanatory variable on the 
probability of default is evaluated as :
6δE(IA)/δXi = F(z)βi   (13)
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Summary of Loan Statistics 
Table 2 presents summary of loan statistics as reported by 
the Board between 1990 and 2003.
According to the Table, in all the three zones, at least 
sixty percent of the applications were approved and 
granted loans. Of those who received the loans, barely 
forty percent of them made full repayment while about 
thirty percent and twenty percent made partial and no 
repayment respectively. In all the zones, over fifty percent 
of the beneficiaries defaulted. On the amount, about 
25%, 18% and 17% of the total loan disbursed were fully 
repaid in Uyo, Eket and Ikot Ekpene zones respectively. 
On the contrary, about 41%, 39% and 53% of the loan 
were partially repaid in Uyo, Eket and Ikot Ekpene zones 
respectively. But about 33%, 44% and 30% of the loan 
were held by beneficiaries who did not made any form of 
repayment in the three zones respectively. The distribution 
therefore reveals that in all the zones, over 75% of the 
loan disbursed by AKSALB in the period under review 
were still held by the benefiting farmers. This situation is 
an indication of high level of loan defaulting among the 
benefiting farmers. However, to fully evaluate the level 
of loan default, loan performance indices are estimated 
and presented on Table 3 and figure 2.
Loan Default and Performance measures
The various measures of default and performance 
computed and shown on Table 3 and figure 2 indicate 
high rates of loan default among the benefiting farmers 
across the three zones. Specifically, about 73 percent 
of the loan granted to the borrowers during the period 
under review was not repaid when due. This substantial 
amount is however held by about 59 percent of the loan 
beneficiaries. This result of high rate of loan default is 
similar to the findings of [16] and [2]. With such high 
level of default, the Board outreach and sustainability 
capacity is questionable thus putting a caveat on the 
relevance of the Board as agricultural micro financing 
institution.
Loan Default Determinants
The result of the determinants of loan default by the 
beneficiaries of AKSALB is presented in Table 4
From the maximum likelihood estimates of the Tobit 
regression, the sigma is 24.2264 and is significant at 1% 
confidence level. This implies that the model has a good 
fit to the data, thus all the explanatory variables are jointly 
significant. Exception of age, educational level and visit 
by loan supervisor, other variables included in the model 
are statistically significant. The non significant of visit by 
loan supervisor’s coefficient may not be unconnected to 
the general lack of commitment common among public 
servants. The significant variables include sex, households 
size, farm size, loan from other sources, primary 
occupation of the beneficiary, time lapse between loan 
application and disbursement, total farm expenditure and 
duration of the granted loans. Sex’s coefficient, 0.0065 
is significant at 5% and carries a positive sign implying 
that male beneficiaries have higher tendencies to default 
than females. This may be because of the multiplicity 
of responsibilities of men as breadwinners, which may 
require them to diverse the proceeds from their farms 
to offset domestic financial commitments rather than 
fulfilling their loan obligations. Household size of the 
beneficiaries is highly significant at 1% with a positive 
sign, which implies that those beneficiaries with larger 
household size tend to default more than those whose 
household size is smaller. This may not be unconnected 
to the problem of both high children and perhaps adult 
dependence. The estimate for farm size is significant at 
5% and is inversely related to the probability of loan 
delinquency. Specifically, the probability of loan default 
decreases at magnitude of 0.019 as the farm size is 
increased, signifying that operators of small scale farm 
land have higher propensity to default loan than large-
scale farm operators. The issue of economies of scale 
always associated with large scale farm production with 
resultant large profit margin as noted by Sankhayan [21] 
may explain the negative relationship of farm size and 
likelihood of loan defaulting. It therefore follows that 
beneficiaries who cultivate large hectare of arable crops 
repaid their loans promptly and are credit worthier than 
small-scale farmers. This finding supports the finding of 
[19]. Further, beneficiaries of AKSALB who had collected 
loans from other financial intermediaries are more likely to 
repay their outstanding loans than those who are not under 
any other loan obligations. The statistical significance 
and sign of the estimated coefficient clearly show that 
ESTIMATION OF LOAN DEFAULT AMONG BENEFICIARIES OF A STATE GOVERNMENT
OWNED AGRICULTURAL LOAN SCHEME, NIGERIA
349J. Cent. Eur. Agric. (2008) 9:2, 343-352
the probability of loan defaulting would fall by 0.0562 
for the beneficiaries with multiply loan sources. This is in 
line with the result of [3] who examined the determinants 
of repayment in the Gramen Bank-style model (PPPCR) 
in Burkina Faso that beneficiaries with multiple sources 
had low level of defaults, and were creditworthier. This 
may be because for such beneficiaries, who have access 
to more credit stock, it would be much earlier for them to 
use credits from other sources to effect repayment even 
when the benefiting farming operation has not yielded 
enough returns to offset loan obligation when due. 
The estimate of 0.0415 for primary occupation of the 
beneficiaries, which is statistically at α = 5%, suggests that 
the beneficiaries who engaged in farming as their major 
occupations would have higher probabilities of defaulting 
than those beneficiaries whose primary occupations are 
not farming. This result further supports the existence of 
high covariate of risk in financing agricultural projects 
as reported in many micro finance empirical literatures. 
Time lapse between loan application and disbursement 
is estimated to be positive and statistically significant 
at α = 5%, showing that the probability of loan default 
increased by 0.0369 as the time between loan application 
and disbursement increases. This is an indication of high 
tendency to default among beneficiaries when loans are 
disbursed later than necessary. This is because loan was 
not available when the beneficiaries really needed it for 
the intended purposes of application. Because of official 
bureaucracy and corruption, government sponsored 
agricultural credit facilities are extended to prospective 
beneficiaries late after planting season has commenced. 
As such, the beneficiaries of such loans would easily 
diverse the loan into unproductive uses thereby 
promoting strategic defaulting. Expectedly, total farm 
expenditure of the beneficiaries is noted to be one of the 
major determinants of loan default. The positive nature 
of the relationship between total farm expenditure and 
the probability of loan default among the beneficiaries 
is an indication that farmers who encounter high cost 
of production would likely not make enough profit 
sufficient to meet the financial commitment attached to 
loan collected. This is particularly so when inputs use 
efficiency among the beneficiaries is low. In such situation, 
the marginal value of what is produced with the loan is 
lower than the unit cost of the inputs used as reported in 
most of the work carried out in the area [23]; [25]; [26] 
and [27]. Duration of loan to the beneficiaries is inversely 
related to the probability of loan delinquency, showing 
that beneficiaries of short-term loan portfolio have higher 
affinity of defaulting than those who collected medium 
term loans. This result is understandable considering the 
nature of agricultural produces, which require a longer 
Table 3: Loan Default and Performance 
Zones LRI (%) LDI (%) BRR (%) BDR (%) 
UYO 21.84 78.16 37.98 62.02 
EKET 27.43 72.57 40.42 59.58 
IKOT EKPENE 30.09 69.91 43.90 56.09 
AVERAGE 26.45 73.54 40.77 59.23 
Source: Computed from equations 7, 8, 9 and 10
Table 4: Result of MLE of loan default determinants 
Explanatory Variables ML estimates t-ratio 
AGE 0.00977 1.2847 
SEX 0.0065** 2.5172 
HHS 0.0875*** 6.5801 
FAS -0.0190*** -1.9923 
EDU -0.0558 -1.6254 
LOS -0.0562** -2.2684 
VIS 0.0637 0.4502 
POC 0.0415** 1.7451 
TIL 0.0369** 2.1180 
TFE 0.0066** 1.9913 
DUL -0.1871** -1.7546 
Sigma � 0.0576*** 2.7301 
**= Significant @ 5% and ***= Significant @ 1% 
350 Journal of Central European Agriculture Vol 9 (2008) No 2
Edet. J. UDOH
time period before any meaningful economic returns 
could be recorded. Therefore, beneficiaries of short-
term loan portfolios may not made substantial turnover 
to repay their loans when due. This result aptly explains 
the high rate of loan delinquencies recorded among the 
AKSALB beneficiaries whose loan portfolios are mostly 
short term. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study evaluates the incidence and severity of loan 
delinquency among beneficiaries of a State government 
owned agricultural loan board (AKSALB). Factors 
affecting the probability of loan default among the 
beneficiaries are also evaluated. Loan default and 
performance measure estimated indicate low level of 
repayment among the beneficiaries during the period 
under review. Accordingly, the indices reveal that over 
75% of the loans disbursed by AKSALB in the period 
under review were still held by the benefiting farmers. 
This situation is an indication of high level of loan default 
among the benefiting farmers. 
Empirical evidence from the Tobit regression estimated 
indicates that certain farmer specific, farm specific 
and facility specific factors significantly affected the 
probability of defaulting of loan by the beneficiaries. 
This suggests that both endogenous and exogenous 
factors contribute to the problem of loan delinquency 
among the beneficiaries in a developing economy. Thus 
the observed loan defaults have some elements of moral 
hazard, strategic defaulting and portfolio defaulting 
arising from business risk. 
Appropriate policy option would be to overhaul the 
institutional framework of the loan board to ensure 
timely disbursement of the approved loan to benefiting 
farmers on or before planting season commence. Further, 
the board should grant more medium and long-term loans 
than short-term loans currently practiced. Benefiting 
farmers should be given adequate training on ways to 
increase their input use efficiency and minimize cost of 
production.
Default among users of productive credits is principally a 
major constraint to increased production and investment 
in any economies of the world. Therefore, suppliers of 
this indispensable resource to practitioners in agricultural 
sector need to evaluate the probability of the farmers 
defaulting within the context of farmer specific, farm 
specific and facility specific factors. The factors shown in 
this paper to influence farmers’ probability of defaulting 
in developing economy like Nigeria could also influence 
the probability of farmers in Central Europe to default. 
The financial sector serving European farmers should be 
aware that high covariate of risk in financing agricultural 
projects as reported in this study permeate regional and 
continental boundaries and guide against high level of 
default as shown in this paper. Also, in case of subsidized 
credit delivery, financial sectors in Europe should guide 
against possibility of strategic and portfolio defaulting as 
is the case reported in this paper.
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Figure 2: Loan default and repayment indices among beneficiaries of AKSALB, 1990-2003
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